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SCHWARZER, District Judge. 
 
          This is an appeal by Tristram Coffin, the debtor, from an order 
of the district court 
affirming an order of the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court's order 
denied the debtor's 
motion styled as one "to reconsider lien avoidance."  Because we and the 
district court lack 
jurisdiction of this appeal, we remand with directions. 
         Coffin was the owner of three parcels of real property on which 
Malvern Federal 
Savings Bank held mortgages to secure loans it had made to Coffin.  When 
Coffin fell in arrears, 
the Bank foreclosed on one of the mortgages.  Coffin then filed a 
voluntary petition in the 
bankruptcy court under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.  The Bank filed 
a proof of claim 
which set forth the arrearages on the three mortgages.  Coffin then filed 
an Amended Chapter 13 
Plan which provided for some of the arrearages.  Without objection from 
the Bank, the bankruptcy 
court on October 19, 1993, confirmed the Plan.  
         Nine months later, on June 23, 1994, the Bank moved "for an Order 
granting relief 
from the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. Section 362 in order that 
said creditor may pursue 
its state foreclosure remedies to enforce its lien against real property 
of the debtor . . . ."  On 
September 1, 1994, following a hearing, the court (1) directed Coffin to 
make payments to the 
Bank in addition to those made under the Plan; (2) directed Coffin to file 
an amended Plan to 
provide adequately for the Bank's secured claim; and (3) ordered the 
automatic stay to remain in 
place pending further hearing on the motion.  In opposition to the Bank's 
motion, Coffin then filed 
his motion to dismiss as res judicata the Bank's motion for relief from 
the automatic stay.  
Following a hearing held on December 1, 1994, the bankruptcy court issued 
an opinion and order, 
denying the Bank's motion for relief from automatic stay and granting 
Coffin's motion to dismiss 
to that extent.  The court found that 
         [the Bank] is bound by the Debtor's Confirmed Plan with respect 
to 
         the distribution to it provided thereunder and therefore relief 
from 
         stay is not appropriate, there being no default under the Plan. 
(Op. 
         7.) 
 
The court then added: 
 
         However, we further find that [the Bank's] lien on the Gay Street 
         Property is not discharged by this Chapter 13 proceeding and that 
         upon lifting of the stay at the conclusion of this case or 
sooner, [the 
         Bank] will be free to exercise its state law remedies under its 
         mortgage and applicable law. (Ibid.) 
 
         The Bank did not appeal from the order denying relief from the 
automatic stay.  
Coffin, however, although the prevailing party on the motion (the court 
having granted his 
dismissal motion and having entered no order adverse to him), filed a 
motion styled as one "to 
reconsider lien avoidance."  The court, describing this motion as "framed 
in a somewhat cryptic 
manner since it suggests that a motion for lien avoidance was the subject 
of the motions that are at 
the heart of this request for reconsideration" interpreted the motion as 
"challeng[ing] this Court's 
legal conclusion that the Bank's liens . . . survive the bankruptcy 
discharge . . . ."  (Op. 1. n.1)  The 
motion was denied.  Coffin then appealed to the district court which, 
stating "the issue in this 
appeal . . . [to] concern[] whether certain liens survive a bankruptcy 
proceeding," (Op.1.) affirmed. 
         It is not necessary for present purposes to examine the 
bankruptcy court's reasoning 
that led to its "finding" that the Bank's mortgage lien had not been 
discharged by the confirmed 
Chapter 13 Plan.  The threshold question is whether that "finding," and, 
in turn, the order denying 
reconsideration and the district court's order affirming it, constitute 
appealable orders.  28 U.S.C. 
 158(a)(1), 1291, 1292(a).  
         While the analysis takes us outside of conventional appealable 
order jurisprudence, 
it is nonetheless firmly grounded on principles of justiciability and 
ripeness.  The bankruptcy 
court's "finding"--that the Bank's lien was not discharged and that at the 
end of the case it would 
be free to exercise its state law remedies under its mortgage--was an 
advisory opinion.  Its order 
denying Coffin's "cryptic" motion for reconsideration decided no actual 
controversy between the 
parties: Coffin had not moved for an order of lien avoidance (it is 
doubtful that he could have done 
so in any event, see 11 U.S.C.  522(f)); the issue of whether the lien 
survived was not before the 
court for adjudication; and the "finding" it made did not determine 
whether the Bank would 
succeed in a subsequent foreclosure action in state court.  If the lien 
survived, it survived by reason 
of the prior proceedings, including the confirmed Plan, not because of the 
court's "finding."  Were 
the Bank to go to state court to foreclose on its mortgage, its right to 
do so would have to be 
determined by that court in light of its interpretation of the terms of 
the Confirmed Plan, as well as 
the terms of the mortgage, applicable state law and, of course, that 
court's findings of fact.  To put 
it differently, had the bankruptcy court made a "finding" that the Bank's 
lien did not survive, the 
state court in the foreclosure proceeding would clearly not be precluded 
from ordering a 
foreclosure, if under applicable law the lien remained enforceable; such a 
finding, not being 
necessary to the decision, would be mere dictum and not give rise to res 
judicata or collateral 
estoppel. 
         "The oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of 
justiciability is that 
federal courts will not give advisory opinions." 13 Wright, Miller, 
Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure,  3529.1, p. 293 (2d ed. 1984).  We have addressed the question 
when a justiciable 
controversy exists--although under the rubric of ripeness--in the context 
of suits for declaratory 
relief.  Although the parties did not invoke the declaratory relief 
statute, 28 U.S.C.  2201, the case 
before us in its present posture is somewhat analogous to one seeking a 
declaration of rights.  In 
Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643 (3rd Cir. 
1990), plaintiff sought 
a declaration that its suppliers are responsible for any liability that 
plaintiff may have to its 
customers as a result of the pending customers' suits.  The district court 
dismissed the complaint 
and this court affirmed.  It defined certain basic principles guiding the 
determination whether an 
actual controversy exists, "[t]he most important of . . . [which] are the 
adversity of the interest of 
the parties, the conclusiveness of the judicial judgment and the practical 
help, or utility of that 
judgment."  Id. at 647.  Here, while there is no question of the adversity 
of the interest of the 
parties, conclusiveness of judicial judgment and any utility of that 
judgment are totally lacking.  
The determination of whether the Bank's lien is enforceable will 
eventually have to be made by 
another court in foreclosure proceedings and the bankruptcy court's advice 
will have no legal 
effect.  See Id. at 649 n.9.     
         That the Bank may have asked the bankruptcy court to interpret 
the Plan with 
respect to the question of the survival of its lien, and that the parties 
advanced opposing positions, 
does not alter the conclusion that what the court said in this respect was 
an advisory opinion.  That 
seems clear under Step-Saver, where plaintiff asked for a declaration of 
non-liability but the 
complaint was dismissed for lack of a ripe controversy.  Nor does it 
matter that foreclosure may be 
imminent since the fact remains that the "finding" of the bankruptcy court 
is an advisory opinion 
that will not have a judicial effect on the outcome of the future 
foreclosure proceedings.  
         Both parties urge us to take jurisdiction to resolve matters that 
would help them 
move on, but jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent.  While we are 
sympathetic to their 
plight, it is of their own making, resulting from the parties' lack of 
care and attention given the 
Chapter 13 proceedings, including the formulation of the Plan.  The 
present problem could and 
should have been anticipated by appropriate provision in the Plan.  The 
bankruptcy court retains 
jurisdiction of the case, however, and it is the proper forum to resolve 
post-confirmation problems 
in appropriate proceedings.  See 11 U.S.C.  1328, 1329.  Presumably the 
court will now grant a 
discharge, close the case, and thereby free the Bank to test the 
continuing validity of its lien by 
bringing a foreclosure action. 
         Accordingly, we remand the matter to the district court and 
direct it to remand it to 
the bankruptcy court.  That court should enter an order vacating so much 
of its opinions as purports 
to find that the Bank's lien survived.    
